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The contributions to this volume are united by a shared interest in innovative forms 
of institutional history mainly – but not exclusively – in the field of political historical 
research. They express a growing dissatisfaction either with the completely un-theoretical 
nature of traditional political history, especially in the area of international relations. Or 
they feel uneasy with the theoretical offers that, for example, the New Institutionalism in 
political science provides. Whereas the former is rightly criticized for its state-centered-
ness and its treatment of nation states not only as ‘data containers’ but also – and more 
importantly – as monolithic collective agents bound up in a system of power within an 
otherwise anarchistic environment, the shortcomings of the latter are seen in a more 
nuanced way.
If we distinguish – in an admittedly coarse and overly pointed fashion – among three 
strands of Institutionalism: the discursivist, the structuralist-evolutionist, and the rational 
choice variant, the first two have been found faulty because of their respective ‘structural-
isms’: the discursivist institutionalism for its contention that institutions are nothing but 
discursive constructions and stabilized solely by the mutual interpretations and expecta-
tions of their members (‘sensemaking’).1 The structuralist-evolutionist institutionalism 
has been criticized because of its inherent reifying and determinist tendencies, and even 
the self-declared ‘historical institutionalism’ has been charged with explaining institu-
tional change – if at all – by appealing to internal evolutionist trends rather than contin-
gencies inherent in the open outcome of situated practices. The rational choice variant 
of institutionalism has not been referred to in any of the contributions of this volume, 
presumably because this approach combines the negative effects of a missing ‘systemic’ 
perspective with its theoretically impoverished concept of agency.
 E.g.: K. E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, London / New Delhi 995.
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The motivation for searching for theoretical alternatives to traditional political history 
and the diverse variations of New Institutionalism are, as the articles show, mainly three-
fold: First, they are no longer content with accounts of politics which treat nation states 
as the only agents and as monolithic containers of power. Second, the repudiation of 
this view leads to a need to ‘decenter’ the political system into a number of different in-
stitutions with diverging access to power and differing degrees of independence. This is 
especially pertinent in the case of international organizations some of the articles in this 
volume deal with. Finally, the authors of these articles are questing for more convincing 
models of institutional change claiming the role of agency and contingency over the role 
of incrementalism and structural evolution in the process.
Most of the contributions to this volume endeavor in probing Anthony Giddens’s ‘struc-
turation theory’ whether it can meet these needs. What is it that makes this early attempt 
to establish a ‘praxeological’ social theory (we speak about the late 1970s) so attractive? 
First of all, it seems that Giddens’s suggestion to replace the ‘dualism’ between agency 
and structure by a ‘duality’ has gained traction among historians who try to analyze 
political institutions not as either collective agents or anonymous structures but as both. 
Furthermore, Giddens’s notion of ‘social system’ is much more open than either his 
antagonists in systems theory (as laid out most prominently by Niklas Luhmann) or 
functionalism (regardless whether you take Talcott Parsons or Robert K. Merton) but 
nevertheless provides for a sense of the internal structure of institutions which would 
define ‘embeddedness’, ‘context-sensitivity’, or ‘situatedness’ more precisely. Last but not 
least, Giddens’s concept of ‘structuration’ which means the reproduction as well as modi-
fication of structures by and through the practices of ‘knowledgeable social agents’ who 
use these very same structures as the media of their action, may provide for a much more 
flexible view on institutional change, allowing for ‘stickiness’ as well as ‘path dependency’ 
or ‘contingency’ – as the eventual effects of ‘unacknowledged conditions of action’ or 
‘unintended consequences’ thereof. 
I do welcome the renewed interest in a political history understood in terms of a new 
institutional history and the subsequent creative reception of Anthony Giddens’s ‘struc-
turation theory’. Yet I deem it necessary to point out in my commentary some of the 
pitfalls an outright adoption of this theory might entail and which are based either in a 
too broad assimilation of Giddens’s vocabulary or his own airiness in many of his con-
crete concepts. Giddens was most concerned with, on the one hand, conceptualizing the 
relationship between the individual agent and the structural properties of social systems 
– that what he calls ‘a new social ontology’, or social theory – and, on the other hand, 
‘large’ institutions on the level of society or on a global scale. This is the reason he did 
give the nation state so much prominence in the era of an escalating Cold War implying 
the danger of nuclear overkill during the 1980s. The theoretically sound explanation of 
‘institutions’ on the meso-level of society is actually not among the numerous strengths 
of Giddens’s approach. It is here, in the center of interest for all of the contributions to 
this volume, that we are asked to extend the ‘structuration’ vocabulary. The main advan-
tage of Giddens’s theoretical exercises is, on the other hand, that he has not left us with a 
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set of canonical definitions, hermetic in nature, but with a host of ideas that may be used 
like a toolbox to assimilate building blocks of other theories or a roadmap to develop 
adaptations of our own. 
Giddens’s emphasis is on the relationship of individual human agents with institutions 
– a term that in his set of concepts is clearly molded after the model of ‘organizations’ 
and not ‘norms’ like in the New Institutional Economics. This also implies that he has 
given much consideration to the relations between and among individual human agents 
within institutions sketching the ‘production’, ‘reproduction’ and ‘modification’ of in-
stitutions as a consummate product of the recurring social practices of the institution’s 
members. Thus ‘structuration theory’ primarily allows for an actor-oriented institutional 
analysis focused on the inner workings of single institutions. Giddens has much less to 
say about the relations between and among several institutions. Here is a point of depar-
ture for further theoretical concept assemblage.
It would lead into a theoretical blind alley, however, to make the claim that the ‘duality 
of structure and agency’ should allow for assigning agency to entire institutions. This 
would only duplicate the reification and ‘humanization’ which is notorious in traditional 
political history’s treatment of collective agents. Institutions are not ‘living organisms’ but 
social systems inhabited by human agents. I believe that the attractiveness of the homol-
ogy that institutions can be attributed agency is rooted in the need to both reintroduce 
‘autonomy’ – as measured against the monolithic view of the nation state – and ‘contin-
gency’ – the potential to act otherwise even under severely constraining conditions to 
refined accounts of inter-institutional relations and institutional change. Yet this twist of 
‘structuration theory’ towards the needs of a new institutional history is unsubstantiated 
in the original Giddens. And it would, that is my point of view, cut back the potentials 
an ‘actor-oriented institutional analysis’ has in political history.
Only individual agents – ‘knowledgeable human agents’ – have agency, and the interest-
ing question is how such agents ‘structure’ institutions in their combined daily practices 
and how their agency in return is ‘structured’ by the respective institution. But, of course, 
the issue of inter-institutional relations matters, and even the ‘actor-oriented institutional 
analysis’ cannot settle for the purely internal interaction among the members involved. 
What is at stake here is the production of a collective outcome which is aimed at meeting 
the institution’s declared or undeclared goals. Talcott Parsons has termed this function of 
social systems ‘goal attainment’. Yet although these institutional outcomes are produced 
by the practices of the institution’s individual members and are perhaps conveyed by 
individual members of the institution – for example by the act of signing a treaty by an 
ambassador of a certain nation state – they cannot be equated with individual agency. I 
suggest calling these outcomes – products of the specialized interaction of knowledgeable 
agents within the institution – ‘institutional effects’. Inter-institutional relations, then, 
are constituted by the communication and interference of several ‘institutional effects’.
‘Institutional effects’ are a homology to ‘agency’ which can – according to Giddens – only 
be attributed to individual human actors. This means that we have to find theoretical ho-
mologies for the structural elements that ‘enable’ actors to act: structural elements such as 
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‘rules’ and ‘resources’ on the institutional level. I would suggest to define these after one 
under-developed concept by Giddens termed ‘structural properties’ of a social system, 
‘empowering assets’ of institutions if you will. Whereas ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ are reserved 
for individual human agents as media of their ‘enabled’ actions, ‘structural properties’ 
are the media for the ‘empowerment’ of institutions. This adds a level of complexity to 
the analysis of institutions, because it forces us to discern the practices and procedures 
that ‘make’ the empowering assets of institutions whose roots can be in the mobilizing of 
individual qualities in the members (e.g., expertise) as well as in the material equipment 
or procedural tuning of the respective institution itself (e.g., the organization of effective 
violence in military units). I deem it very important at this point to direct your attention 
to an under-appreciated chapter of Giddens’s Constitution of Society, namely the one on 
“Time, Space, and Regionalization” In admittedly rather cursory remarks Giddens here 
establishes a measurement for the power of institutions (in his case prominently: such as 
the nation state) in terms of ‘distanciation’ – or geographical reach – of institutions, ‘time 
spacing’ – or the stability of institutions over time, including the absence of its members 
– and ‘regionalization’ which a little flippantly could be illustrated by the saying “divide 
and conquer”. It will be of paramount importance not only to analyze the internal pro-
duction of “institutional effects” but to extend the analysis to the actual consequence of 
these effects in inter-institutional relations.
“Time, Space, and Regionalization” is also a mandatory starting point when it comes to 
the explanation of institutional change. ‘Structuration theory’ has been charged with an 
explanatory indifference in regard to the explanation of change because it attributes all 
change to contingency. The result would be an ‘episodic’ take on historical development 
which could be descriptive at best, only narrative at worst.2 This is only one side of the 
coin. ‘Time and space distanciation’ allows for a theoretical juxtaposition of the ‘poten-
tial life-span’ of institutions with their actual real-time biography, and this opens up very 
potent avenues of explanatory analysis. Might, for example, the 40 years endurance of 
the GDR be closely linked to the lifespan of its machine park much of which dated back 
from the interwar years and was not successfully modernized on an encompassing scale 
after 1945?
Yet how can we extend the ‘actor-oriented institutional analysis’ from the micro-level 
of intra-institutional practices and the meso-level of the production of ‘institutional ef-
fects’ to the macro-level of inter-institutional relations? I think a reappraisal of Giddens’s 
concept of ‘social system’ could be a valuable starting point. His notion of ‘system’ is 
much more open and looser than Luhmann’s rather rigid use of the term in his theory 
of functional differentiation. For Giddens, a social system is a set of structural properties 
which organizes mutually recursive practices of its members and relies for its stability 
on built-in mechanisms of ‘system integration’. A social system can change without the 
danger of disintegration and also endures the temporary absence of its members (‘time 
2 H. Joas and W. Knöbl (ed.), Sozialtheorie. Zwanzig einführende Vorlesungen. 4. ext. ed. Frankfurt am Main 20, 
pp. 426-428.
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distanciation’). On the other hand, a social system is constituted, reproduced and modi-
fied by nothing other than the mutually recursive practices it organizes. Thus the ‘system-
ness’ of social systems must be located not in the material practices as such (which differ 
from system type to another) but in their ‘recursiveness’. Consequently, for the agents 
involved as well as for the observer the ‘systemness’ of social systems appears as a ‘mode’ 
which sets the ‘key’ as to what practices are required and what rules and resources the 
members can command in the process. As the ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ are the ‘media’ for 
social action of individual agents, the ‘modes’ of social systems configure and calibrate 
those ‘media’ to the purpose or ‘mission’ of the system as a whole. As can be seen easily, 
this specification of the Giddensian concept of ‘system’ is geared to a notion of ‘institu-
tion’ which actually implies ‘organization’. Yet whereas not all social systems are organi-
zations, all organizations are social systems. Organizations, then, appear as specifically 
modern types of social systems with a high degree of ‘systemness’ or, in Giddens’s words, 
‘system integration’. Whereas in premodern times almost all of the ‘enactment’ of social 
systems had to be through rituals (recursiveness in time), the strong ‘modes’ of modern 
organizations – without jettisoning rituals completely – transform much of the ritualistic 
‘enactment’ into ‘routines’ (repetitive synchronic recursiveness).3
According to Giddens, all human interaction combines elements of signification, legiti-
mation and power / domination in varying proportions. We cannot simply claim these 
elements for the level of ‘institutional effects’ in the form of a simple homology. How-
ever, we can ask – bearing in mind that we more or less mean ‘organization’ when we 
talk of ‘institutions’ – what forms ‘institutional effects’ typically assume, and then try to 
identify their basic functions when looking at empirically observable institutions as the 
contributions to this volume have demonstrated. I suggest that typical ‘institutional ef-
fects’ of organizations are: ‘products’, ‘procedures’, ‘operations’, ‘information’, ‘decisions’, 
‘classification / recognition’, ‘consultation / deliberation’, ‘negotiation’, and ‘representa-
tion’. This comprehensive but probably not exhaustive typology enables institutional 
analysis, on the one hand, to scrutinize the production of ‘institutional effects’ by con-
crete practices within the institutions and to locate the individual agents in the process. 
On the other hand, institutional analysis gains a vocabulary for the historical reconstruc-
tion of inter-institutional relations.
And here, on this macro-level of inter-institutional relations – which is clearly in the 
focus of almost all of the contributions to this volume – we would have to come up 
with an equivalent to the concept of ‘social system’ which is only valid where individual 
human agents are involved. Yet even the fact that ‘institutional effects’ are often com-
municated or executed by designated individuals, or groups of people, does not war-
rant the transfer of the concept ‘system’ to a higher level of aggregation. Yet the idea of 
‘systemness’ as a ‘mode’ of organizing recursive practices is valid on this level. Giddens 
himself has provided us with two of his sometimes rather fuzzy neologisms, namely the 
‘axis of structuration’ and the ‘structural principles’. They mean basically the same thing 
 B. Stollberg-Rilinger, Rituale. Historische Einführungen, Frankfurt am Main/New York 20.
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from juxtaposed perspectives: ‘structural principles’ define the ‘modes’ of institutions, 
organizations and complexes of human interactions in a certain sector of society (not to 
be mistaken with nation states), whereas ‘axis of structuration’ has the same designation 
with the view ‘from the bottom up’. This sounds very sophisticated as a way to bridge 
the micro-macro divide but is not excessively helpful in analyzing phenomena on the 
macro-level of society (not to be mistaken with nation states) in an – even historically 
spanned diachronic – view. 
I would suggest adapting Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘social field’ for this level of 
social ‘systemness’. This term is open enough for allowing the search for the boundaries 
– and who sets them. It also allows for the identification what practices count – out of 
the list above – and who would be admitted as an institutional player in the field with 
what ‘empowering’ structural properties and what ‘legitimate’ institutional effects. All 
contributions to this volume deal with political institutions. This means that the in-
stitutional effect ‘products’ would be a matter of negligence since it pertains mostly to 
economic organizations. Yet all the other typical practices associated with organizations 
would be interesting areas of research. The contributions to this volume have been most-
ly concerned with political organizations, and here it would be of utmost importance 
to single out what qualifies political institutions to be recognized as legitimate players 
in the political field and what ‘structural properties’ they could bring to bear. Most of 
the articles have already given intriguing insight in the concrete workings of national 
and international organizations. It is, of course, time to systematize these empirical ap-
proaches to a new historical institutionalism, and theory-building is one of the genuine 
tasks of historians. On the other hand, the discussion of limitations of currently available 
theoretical approaches leads us to see that for the historian the narrative of concrete cases 
is our eventual task, and narrative descriptions on the development of and confronta-
tion between political institutions will help to carve out avenues for further theoretical 
advances.
